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nothing in the business itself to distinguish it in this respect from
any other kind of business ; and we deny that the burden can be
imposed on any corporation or individual not acting under a license
or by virtue of a franchise, of buying property and hiring labor
merely to furnish public statistics, unless upon due compensation to
be made therefor.
So far as the owner or operator of a mine shall contract for the
mining of coal or the selling of coal by weight, we see no objection
to the statute as imposing upon him the duty of procuring scales
for that purpose. But we do not think that he can be compelled to
make all his contracts in these respects to be regulated by weight,
and when he has no necessity for the use of scales in these respects,
he cannot, in our opinion, be compelled to keep and use them. We
think the court erred in its ruling in giving the one and refusing
the other instruction.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.1
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.
2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. s
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.4
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSUIRE. 5
ACTION. See Insurance; Slander.
AGENT. See Insurance.
ASSIGNMENT.
Partial Assignment of Debt may be enforced in Equity-Assigynnent
not in Fraud of Insolvent Law.-A. had made a contract to erect a.
school-house for the city of N., but became insolvent, and, in order to
secure funds to enable him to complete his contract, made an assignment
to C. of $600, which was a part of the sum to be due to him from the
city of N. upon the completion of the school-house, and 0. thereupon
advanced him certain sums of money. Held, that the assignment was
I From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 117 Il. Rep.
2 From Joseph W. Spaulding, Esq.; to appear in 78 M)e. Rep.
3 The cases will probably appear in 142 or 143 Mass. Rep
4 From J. Shaaf Stockctt, Esq., Rporter ; to appear in 65 Md. Reports.
6 The cases will probably appear in 64 or 65 N. H. Rep.
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not in fraud of the insolvent law, and could be enforced in equity:
James v. City of.Newton, 142 or 143 Mass.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Promissory Note-Estoppel.-A promissory note reciting "we" pro-
mise to pay, and signed "D. P. Livermore, Treas'r, Hallowell Gas-Light
Co.," is the note of the individual and not of the corporation: McClure
v. Livermore, 78 Me.
An action on such a note against the corporation, and its default, will
not estop. the owner from maintaining an action against the individual,
when it does not appear that the acts of the plaintiff caused the defend-
ant to change his position, or to take some action injurious to himself:
Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Homicide-Admissibility of Evidenee-Res Gests.-On a trial for
murder, evidence of what occurred at a saloon, a half a square from the
saloon where the homicide occurred, and only four or five minutes be-
fore the killing, is admissible to show the movements and general con-
duct of the prisoner, immediately preceding the killing, and that he was
armed and prepared for mischief, and in a ftame of mind likely to result
in mischief: Kernan v. State, 65 Md.
What was said and done by others-at the sapie time and in company
with the prisoner, was only a part of what he was directly connected
with, and was inseparably connected with the history of his conduct at
the time, and necessary to an intelligent appreciation of his actions: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAws.
Insolvency-Jurisdction- Discharge in another State.-A defend-
ant's discharge under the insolvency law of Massachusetts is no bar to
a suit in New Hampshire, on a contract made in that state before the
insolvency, when the plaintiff has not resided there since the insolvency
proceedings were begun, and has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the
insolvency court: Norris v. Atkinson, 64 or 65 N. H.
CONTRACT. See Insurance.
CORPORATION. See Master and Servant.
Municipal Corporation-Rules of Procedure- Quorum.-In author-
izing the City Council of Baltimore to "settle their rules of procedure,"
the Legislature did not confer on the Council the power to declare by
rule what number of their body should constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business: Heiskell v. The Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 65 Md.
In a municipal corporation consisting of a definite number, in the ab-
sence of any Legislative declaration of what number shall constitute a
quorum or legal body, a majority of the members elected shall constitute
such quorum or legal body: Id.
A mere majority of the members elected being present, the acts of the
City Council of Baltimore are valid, notwithstanding the existence of a
rule adopted by the Council, requiring that two-thirds of the members
elected shall be necessary to constitute a quorum: Id.
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A municipal corporation cannot, by a rule made by itself, either en-
large or diminish its own powers: Id.
DAMAGES. See Eminent Domain; Slander; Trespass; Waters.
EMINENT DO-IAIN.
Damages, Aleasure of-Destruction of Pond Supplying Water to a
Steam Mill-Evidence to show other Sources of Supply.--In a proceed-
ing to condemn a strip of land for a railroad track, which crossed a pond
supplying the land-owner's steam-mill with water, on the question of
damages to the mill property not taken, the defendant gave estimates on'
the basis that the pond would be destroyed as a source of supply of
water for the mill, and there would be no other means of supply. The
petitioner then offered to show that a certain water-works company would
furnish the mill regularly with all the water it might require, at a less
cost than that of pumping from the pond, and also that a creek flowing
nearer the mill than the pond had a capacity to furnish better water and
an abundance, for the use of the mill, which the court refused to admit.
field, that the court erred in excluding the evidence : Railroad and
Coal Co. v. Switzer, 117 111.
EQUITY. See .Assignment; Mortgage.
ESTOP'PEL. See Bills and Notes.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law; Eminent Domain; Insurance; Neg-
ligence; Stocks.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See Insurance.
INSOLVENT LAW. See Assignment; Conflict of Laws.
INSURANCE.
Contract-Evidence-Executors and Administrators-Action.-C.
obtained a certificate of life insurance from the United Order of the
Golden Cross, which provided that the sum insured should be paid to
11. at C.'s death. That was done : Held, in an action by C.'s executor
against H., that evidence was admissible to prove the defendant pro-
mised C., that, after deducting whatever sum might be due him fiom
C., at C.'s death, from the insurance money, he would pay the balance
over to C.'s heirs. Held, further, that C.'s executor was the proper
party to bring suit on such a promise : Catland's Exec'r v. .Hoyt, 78
Me.
Marine Policy-Spontaneous Combustion.-In an ordinary marine
policy, the insurance against fire does not cover the case of spontaneous
combustion, caused by the inherent infirmity of the goods insured : Ins.
Co. v. Adler, 65 
Id.
Insurance Company.-Stock and Mutual Departments-Rights of
Stockholers.-The surplus of earnings accumulated from the operations
of the stock-department of an insurance company, run upon the stock
and mutual principles, the business of the two departments being en-
tirely distinct and conducted separately, the taxes of the guaranty-
stock department being paid by the company, and charged to the stock
department, and none of the earnings of the stock department being
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paid to the holders of mutual policies, upon the winding up of 
the affairs
of the stock department, belongs to the stock department, and should 
be
distributed among the share holders of the fund of that department 
ac-
cording to their several shares: Ins. Cb. v. Brown. 142 or 143 
Mass.
Fire insurance- Cancellation of Policy-Liability of 
Agent efor Ny-
ligence- -ageAtionThe question of whether an agent of a fire
insurance company has used reasonable diligence in cancelling 
a policy
after being instructed so to do by the company, is a mixed question 
of
law and fact ; and where it appears that the agent could have 
notified
the insured of the refusal of the company to take the risk within 
half an
hour, but did not do so for several days, it will not be held that 
the court
before whom the case was tried, without a jury, erred in finding 
that
the agent did not exercise that diligence which it was his duty to use,
and in refusing to rule that the company could not recover of 
the agent
the amount paid by them under the policy; and an offer by the 
agent to
show that it is customary for agents of insurance companies to 
notify
the insured, in such cases, at their own convenience, and that 
they are
given from five to ten days to cancel a policy, is inadmissible: Phknix
Ins. Co. v. Frssell, 142 or 143 Mass.
An insurance company having paid a policy after proof of loss, in
consequence of a liability caused by the negligence of an agent in not
using reasonable diligence in cancelling a policy, after having been 
in-
structed to do so, may bring an action against the agent for the amount
so paid, immediately after such payment, although the sixty days which
it reserves as a time within which to pay the loss has not expired : Id.
LEx Loci CONTRACTUS. See Stocks.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Injuries on Machine- Corporation not Obliged to Fence Machine-
EContributory _Neglgence-Peculiarly Dangerous Machine-Risks 
of
Employment- Charge.-A manufacturing corporation is 
not bound to
fence a machine used in their business, where the machine is not of a
peculiarly dangerous character; and is not liable for personal injuries
caused by the machine to an employee who was obliged to pass the
machine in going tG his work, and to whom suitable instructions had
been given, having reference to his age and capacity, so as to enable him
to understand the dangers of the employment in which he was engaged.
Neither is the corporation liable for injuries because the machine might
have been placed in a different or less dangerous position. Evidence
that a gate might have been placed in front of the machine is imma-
terial: Rock v. Indian Orchard Mills, 142 or 143 Mass.
Exceptions to the judge's charge will not be sustained unless it is
made to appear that there is some substantial error in the charge which
misled the jury; and, where there was evidence that the plaintiff was
playing about the machine on which he was injured, a statement in the
charge, that if the jury found that to be the fact, the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, which would prevent him from recovering,
is not.open to objection : Id.
It is not charging upon the facts for a judge to state in his charge
that a machine on which- the plaintiff was injured, was not a peculiarly
dangerous one, the fact being self-apparent : Id.
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An employee of a manufacturing corporation, who has been properly
instructed as to the use of a machine upon which he is set to work, is
supposed to undertake the risk of his employment, and cannot recover
for injuries resulting from use of the machine, and the company is not
obliged to fence the machine, or place it in a less dangerous part of &he
room : Id.
Dangerous Einployment-Duty of Master to give .Notice.-It is the
duty of a master who sets a servant to work in a place of danger to give
him such notice and instruction as is reasonably required by the youth
or inexperience or want of capacity of the servant; and this duty is not
confined to cases where the servant is a man of manifest imbecility:
Atkins v. Merrick tread Co., 142 or 143 Mass.
MORTGAGE.
Surety-Eguity.-Where a surety on a mortgage debt pays the same
to the holder and receives the note and mortgage, without any assign-
ment or discharge written thereon, he cannot maintain a bill in equity
against the owners of the equity of redemption, praying that the mort-
gage "may be decreed to be still subsisting, that he may be subrogated to
the rights of the mortgagee therein, and may be empowered to foreclose
the same according to law:" .ynn v. Richardson, 78 Me.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
Death of Employee-Evidence-Defect in Machinery.-In an action
to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate, where
the evidence showed that the deceased was burned by a quantity of
starch which escaped from a boiler, the action cannot be maintained
where the evidence does not disclose that the boilers were improperly
constructed or out of repair, and that the accident did not occur by
reason of the carelessness of the deceased. Blanchette, Adm'r v. Border
City Manufacturing Co., 142 or 143 Mass.
Evidence-Railroads- Unsuitable Stoypng Places.-In an action for
personal injuries sustained on leaving the rear car of a train at a station,
evidence that others had previously been directed to take that car, and
in alighting from it as the plaintiff did, had been injured, is competent
to show negligence in the defendants in not providing a suitable stop-
ping place, and to show want of negligence in the plaintiff: Bullard v.
Boston & M. Rd., 64 or 65 N. H.
NoTicE. See Master and Servant.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
Commission Merchant - Consignor -S eparate Accounts- Usage.-
Where the plaintiff, a commission merchant, receives consignments from
the defendant, a manufacturer, who is the owner of three different mills,
run under three different names, one being carried on in the name of
defendant, the plaintiff being ignorant that the three mills are owned
by the defendant, and the accounts of the ,three concerns being kept
separate, in an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the balance of
an account with the mill run under the name of the defendant, where
the answer is a general denial and payment, the defendant will not be.
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allowed to show that a balance is due him upon the account between
plaintiff and another of the mills, which should be credited him in this
suit, and such balance can only be availed by way of set-off; and de-
fendant cannot show that there were in the plaintiff's hands, goods from
the mill run in defendant's name, which were not included in the ac-
count sued on : alcott v Smith, 142 or 143 Mass.
In an action against the defendant, a manufacturer, by a commission
merchant, to recover a balance due for advances on manufactured goods,
the latter will be allowed to. charge in his account for printing the goods,
it appearing that this was done under the usage of commission mer-
chants, and was a necessary charge : Id.
QuoRum. See Corporation.
REDEMPTION. See Tenants in Common.
RES GEsTz. See Criminal Law.
SET-OF.
Defendant holding Affirmative- Time when Right of Action onCross.
Demand must Accrue.-In pleading a set-off, the defendant assumes the
position of a plaintiff, and, in order to recover, is required to prove the
same facts which he would be required to prove if he had brought his
action on his demand : Ellis v. Cothran, 117 Ill.
A defendant cannot recover on a matter by way of set-off, when his
claim or demand was not due at the time plaintiff brought his action :
nor can he, after suit brought, purchase a demand against the plaintiff
and set it up as a defence : Id.
SLANDER.
Actionable Words-Special Damage.-Words falsely and maliciously
spoken, which impute to a clerk the want of any qualifications which,
as such, he ought to possess, or any misconduct which would unfit him
to discharge faithfully and correctly all the duties pertaining to his posi-
tion, are actionable, if in consequence thereof he is dismissed from his
employment: Wilson v. Cottman, 65 Md.
When some specific damage is caused by words falsely and maliciously
spoken, they may become actionable, when otherwise the law would give
no redress against the person speaking them: Id.
The defendant falsely and maliciously spoke of the plaintiff the fol-
lo~ing words, by reason of which he lost his position as clerk and assist-
ant weigh-master: " He has caused the downfall and ruin of my clerk."
"Will (meaning the plaintiff), has been the ruination of my clerk; I
do not want him (meaning the plaintiff), to have anything to do with
my business ;" meaning that plaintiff should not weigh any goods con-
signed to the defendant. .eld, that the words thus spoken were action-
able: .1d.
SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION. See Insurance.
STOCKHOLDERS. See Insurance.
STOCKS.
Stock Gambling-Sales on Margins-Lex Loci Contractus-Evdence.
-The plaintiffs sued the defendahit in assumpsit to recover an alleged
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balance due them for services, advances, and interest on purchases and
sales of stocks, bonds and grain, alleged to have been made by them for
defendant at his request. Both plaintiffs and defendant resided in York,
Pennsylvania, where the former conducted the business of bankers and
brokers. The plaintiffs bought and sold on orders of the defendant, who
deposited from time to time, a margin, or left certain profits as they ac-
crued, with the plaintiffs to cover and protect them in the fluctuations
of prices. The plaintiffs made their negotiations in the markets of New
York, Baltimore, Chicago and Philadelphia. The defendant failing to
keep up his margins, the plaintiffs sold some stocks credited to him, and
sued for the balance still required for their reimbursement. The de-
fendant pleaded specially that by the law of Pennsylvania, where the
contracts were made and to be performed, they were all gambling trans-
actions and void, as the real intent of the parties was to wager on, and
speculate in the rise or fall of the prices of the articles dealt in, which
were not to be actually delivered, but the one party was to pay and the
other party to accept the differences between the contract prices and the
market prices of the same at the dates fixed for executing said contracts,
or when said contracts should be closed. Held, 1st. That it was compe-
tent for the defendant to show, that although in form the transaction
was perfectly legal, it was in fact a mere guise under which a gambling
transaction might be conducted. 2d. That although the plaintiffs may
have acted merely as defendant's broker in negotiating the contracts,
and were suing not on the contracts, themselves, but for services per-
formed and money advanced for the defendant, they stood in the same
position as if seeking to enforce the original agreement, and could not
recover for services rendered or losses incurred by themselves in forward-
ing the transaction. 3d. That as to the locus of the transaction, the
jury should have been given the law of Pennsylvania, as comprised in
the decisions of that state, bearing on wagering contracts within its lim-
its. 4th. That the action being for services rendered by the plaintiffs to
the defendant, it was their relations with him on which the suit was
based; and the parties with whom they dealt in making the purchases
and sales were in nowise connected with the suit. 5th. That the validity
of the transaction was to be tested by the Pennsylvania cases, according
to which, if there was such an understanding between the plaintiffs and
the defendant, as the latter claimed there was, the transactions were
merely wagers, and no recovery could be had by the plaintiffs : Stewart
v. S&hall, 65 Md.
STREETS.
Rights of Abutting Lot Owners to Mine under.-A party owning city
lots has not the right to make a subterranean passage from one to
another through the underlying soil of a public street, the fee of which
is not in him, in order to mine and remove minerals, etc., even though
no injury may result thereby to the street as such : Zinc Co. v. City of
La Salle, 117 Ill.
SURETY. See -Mortgage.
TENANTS IN COMM1xON.
Improvements itpon the 0ommon Property.-One tenant in common
may rightfully insist that the other shall contribute his proportionate
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share for the preservation of the joint property, but he cannot insist that
he shall enter upon new investments, to be paid for from the joint pro.
perty, or out of other funds belonging to him, against his judgment and
inclination : Field v. Leiter, 117 111.
Redemption from Taz SaM.-Where one tenant in common of land
exercises the right given him by law to redeem the entire premises from
a sale for taxes, such redemption will inure to the benefit, also, of his
co-tenant, upon the condition that he, or those claiming under him, will
pay the one redeeming one-half of the cost of the redemption: Lomax
v. Gindele, 117 Ill.
Where one of two tenants in common of a tract of land which had
been sold for taxes, instead of redeeming directly from the sale, made
an agreement with the holder of the certificate of purchase that the
latter should take out a tax deed thereon and then convey the premises
to the former, which was done, it was held, that the transaction
amounted to but a redemption for the benefit of both tenants in common,
and that a court of equity would compel the one taking a conveyance of
the tax title, to convey to the other one individual half of the tax title,
upon payment of half the cost thereof: I.
Partition -Decree, Conclusiveness of.-Adecree of partition not
appealed from in a court of probate, is conclusive upon the parties and
their privies as to the title at the time of its rendition ; and they are
estopped to claim a greater interest in the land than the share decreed
to them: Davis v. Durgin, 64 or 65 N. H.
TRESPASS.
Quw're Glausum Fregt.-Damages.-In trespass guxre clausum for
felling the defendant's trees across the line of fence, and covering the
plaintiff's land with brush, the measure of damages is not confined to
the expense of removing the brush, nor is it limited to the value of the
land encumbered: Hutchinson v. Parker, 64 or 65 N. H.
TROVER AND CONVERSION.
Evidence of Conversion-Defendant's Breach of Contract.-To con-
stitute a conversion of chattels there must be some exercise of dominion
over the property, in repudiation of or inconsistent with the owner's
rights: Evans v. Mason, 64 or,65 N. H.
In an action of trover for a horse hired by the defendant to go to and
from a place named, without stopping, his mere delay in returning is-
not sufficient evidence of a conversion : [d..
TURNPIKE.
Toll.-The Baltimore and Fredericktown Turnpike Road, under its
charter (Act of 1804, ch. 51), is entitled to charge and collect toll for
ten miles, from a person passing through the ninth gate on its road
westward from Baltimore city-toll for the three miles east and the seven
miles west of the gate-whether he actually starts from Frederick and
stops at Middletown, which is only five miles west of the gate, or not ;
and a person going east must pay for the same ten miles, and not simply
for the six miles between gates numbers nine and eight: Turnpike Road
v. Routzahn, 65 Md.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
USAGE. See Insurance ; Principal and Agent.
WATERS.
F"oatable Streams -Log Driving-Reasonable use-Damages.-
Where one deliberately and without compulsion, selects a particular por-
tion of a floatable stream, for the storage of logs, and thereby prevents
another from entering such common highway with a drive of logs from
a tributary stream, he is liable to such other person for the damages oc-
casioned thereby : LfcPheters v. Log Driving Co., 78 Me.
Wages and board of men while waiting for a reasonable time would
be an element of damages; so, too, would the expense of moving one
crew out and another in, as well as the increased cost, if any, of mak-
ing the drive next season, and the interest on the contract price for
making the drive during such time as the payment thereof was delayed,
because of inability to complete the drive on account of such obstruc-
tion: Pd.
The loss of supplies left in the woods, for use when completing the
drive, and destroyed by wild beasts, would not constitute an element of
damage, being too remote: Id.
Agueduct-Easement-Presc )tion--Extiguishment of Easements.
-An easement originating from water supplied by a spring not situated
upon land belonging to the grantor of the plaintiff's premises, will not
pass as an appurtenance to the estate conveyed, unless it has become at-
tached to the same. Douty v. Dunning, 78 Me.
But where such easement, although not originally belonging to an
estate, has become appurtenant to it, either by express or implied grant,
or by prescription, a conveyance of that estate will carry with it such
easement, whether mentioned in the deed or not, although it may not
be necesary to the employment of the estate by the grantee -, P.
There may be such an adverse and exclusive use of water flowing
through an aqueduct, and for such a period of time, as may well be con-
sidered presumptive evidence of a grant : Id.
Such right may be thereby acquired by prescription: .d.
The right to draw water from a spring and to have pipes laid in the
soil of another, and for that purpose to enter thereon, repair and renew
the same, constitutes an interest in the realty, assignable, descendible
and divisible : Id.
Easements growing out of it may)be acquired by grant or prescription,
and thus become the objects of title in others : Rd.
An easement will become extinguished by unity of title and posses-
sion of the dominant and servient estates in the same person by the same
right : Id.
But in order that the unity of title shall operate to extinguish an
existing easement, the ownership of the two estates must be co-exten-
sive, equal in validity, quality, and all other circumstances of right. If
one is held in severalty and the other only as to a fractional part thereof
by the same person, there will be no extinguishment of the easement:
Id.
WILL.
R4pht of Disposition of Property-Disposing Capacity.-A party
having the capacity to make a will, may dispose of his property as he
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sees fit, and if he makes an unequal disposition among his heirs, it is
wholly immaterial whether he has any reasons therefor or not. In a
case where the evidence as to a person's capacity to make a will was con-
flicting, the court instructed the jury, that if they should believe, from
the evidence, that at the time of the execution of the instrument (the
validity of which was in question), by the testator, he was so diseased
mentally, as not to be of sound mind. then their verdict should be for
the complainants, the contestants : Held, that the instruction was erro-
neous, as it stated the rule too broadly: Freman v. Easly, 117 Ill.
A person may be so diseased, mentally, as not to be of sound mind,
and yet possess a disposing mind, which is the mental capacity to know
and understand what disposition he may wish to make of his property,
and upon whom he will bestow his bounty: id.
A person who is capable of transacting ordinary business is also capa-
ble of making a valid will. The derangement or imbecility, to incapaci-
tate a person from making a will, must be of that character which ren-
ders him incapable of understanding the effects and consequences of his
acts. If a party is capable of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of
life, so that he may comprehend what disposition he may wish to make
of his property, and be able to select the objects of his bounty, that is
all that is required to make a will: rd.
Bequest- Vested Interest-Life Interest-Remainder.-A bequest of
a sum of money to one after the decease of the legatee, to whom the
income of the money is given during life, vests atonce on the testator's
death: Crosby v. Crosby, 64 or 65 N. H.
Election to TaMe under Will.-Where a testator devises property to
his sons, and also property belonging to them to another, they must either
relinquish their claim to their own property so devised, or to the pro-
vision made in their favor. A party cannot take under a will and con-
trary to it. In such case he must make his election: Ditch v. Sennot,
11M Ill.
The doctrine of election does not apply where the testator has but a
part interest in an estate which he devises ; but even in such a case, if
it is apparent from the terms of the will that the testator intended to
devise the whole estate, including the interest of a third person, then
the doctrine will apply as to such third person, if a devisee : Id.
WITNESS.
Competency of Grand Juror to Testify to Evidence given before
Grand Jury.-On the trial of a party for larceny, after laying the proper
foundation, a grand juror was called to contradict one of the defendant's
witnesses, by testifying to his statements on oath before the grand jury.
which he had denied. It was objected that a grand juror could not be
called as a witness to disclose what occurred before the grand jury, but
the court held the evidence proper; Bressler v. The State, 117 Ill.
